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INTRODUCTION

T

he United States Court of International Trade has exclusive nationwide jurisdiction to review United States Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) decisions concerning
the tariff classification of imported merchandise.1 Tariff classi* Lawrence Friedman is a partner in the Chicago office of Barnes, Richardson
& Colburn where he practices exclusively in the areas of customs, export, and
trade law. He is also an Adjunct Professor of Law at the John Marshall Law
School Center for International law. He began his career as a law clerk to the
Honorable Dominick L. DiCarlo of the Court of International Trade. He holds
a J.D. and LL.M. in Intellectual Property law from the John Marshall Law
School and serves on the Board of Directors of the Customs and International
Trade Bar Association. Brad Opfermann, J.D., a recent graduate of the John
Marshall Law School Center for International Law, provided invaluable assistance in completing this article.
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fication is important to both the United States and to importers
because it controls, among other things, the rate of duty applicable to goods entering the United States. Importers may challenge the classification that Customs assigns to merchandise in
an effort to seek the refund of duties,2 to avoid the imposition of
monetary penalties for noncompliance,3 to avoid the application
of quantitative quotas, or for other reasons.
Most tariff classification cases do not involve disputed facts
concerning the structure, operation, or other physical aspects of
the merchandise. Consequently, these cases often turn entirely
on questions of law involving the interpretation of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.4 Consistent with
the legal nature of these disputes, most classification cases are
resolved via motions for summary judgment because there are
no material facts in dispute.5
Nevertheless, the parties to classification disputes generally
engage in sometimes lengthy and expensive discovery involving
document production and deposition testimony from both lay
and expert witnesses. The focus of this discovery is often to confirm, on the record, the nature of the merchandise in a way
that fits each party’s understanding of the tariff language. Discovery may also involve expert opinion as to the common and
commercial meaning of the tariff language.6 Each party then
argues for the Court of International Trade to adopt its interpretation of the tariff language and then to apply the usually
uncontroverted facts to the interpreted text.
The result is that customs practitioners—both private and
governmental—may expend considerable time and effort developing facts to fit a legal interpretation of the law that the court
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2012).
2. 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (2012).
3. See 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (2012).
4. See Levi Strauss Co. v. United States, 21 C.I.T. 677, 679 (1997) (“[T]he
purely legal question found in most classification cases has already been answered.”) rev’d on other grounds, 222 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
5. A review of decisions of the Court of International Trade showed that
from January 1, 2011 through April 8, 2014, there were forty-five published
opinions on tariff classification. Of those, only six referred to a trial. The remainder were motions for summary judgment or motions to dismiss. That
means that only about 13% of classification cases involve a dispute regarding
facts.
6. See, e.g., Samsung International, Inc. v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d
1330, 1342 (2012).
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will not ultimately accept. For one party or the other, that will
be wasted effort.
This Article proposes that practitioners adopt an alternative
approach modeled on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the
patent case Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.7 Following
a Markman model, practitioners would ask the Court of International Trade to hold a hearing or entertain motions, preferably early in the dispute, to determine the scope of the tariff
headings at issue. With that information, the parties would be
able to devise a discovery plan that, given the court’s guidance
as to the controlling law, focuses on any relevant questions of
fact that may be necessary to resolve. It is suggested that practitioners adopting this approach may find a quicker and more
efficient resolution of customs classification disputes. Given the
expense of customs litigation, this approach may also encourage more cases to be brought to the Court of International
Trade, which would result in greater business and legal certainty in the application of the tariff laws. As an alternative,
absent adoption by practitioners, the court might choose to
adopt rules modeled on local patent rules in district courts in
order to force the early resolution of questions of law.
I. MARKMAN HEARINGS
Markman was a patent infringement dispute relating to a
system for tracking clothing and other articles brought into dry
cleaning shops.8 The specific question brought to the Supreme
Court was whether the correct interpretation of patent claims
was a question of law to be decided by the court or a question of
fact to be decided by a jury.
As background, a patent must describe the scope of the
claimed invention.9 In American patent law, the scope of the
patent is defined by two elements. The first is the specification,
which is a clear and concise description of the invention.10 The
specification must provide enough detail to permit someone
skilled in the relevant art (i.e., the relevant area of technology
or industry) to implement the invention.11 The second part is
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
Id.
Id. at 373.
Id.
Id.
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made up of the patent claims, which “distinctly claim” the subject matter the patent applicant regards as the invention.12 According to the Supreme Court in Markman, the claim defines
the scope of the patent. Assuming the application matures into
a granted patent, infringement results when the patent claim
covers the infringer’s product or process.13
Thus, like tariff language, the patent claim sets the metes
and bounds of the subject merchandise. The claims define the
scope of the patented invention in much the same way that a
tariff heading defines the scope of the merchandise it covers.
And, also like tariff language, the interpretation of the patent
claim is purely a question of law.
The fundamental question before the Supreme Court in
Markman was whether claims interpretation is a question for
the judge or for the jury. In tariff litigation, the question of
what issues go to a jury is not relevant because actions challenging tariff classification determinations may not be tried
before a jury.14 Nevertheless, in language strikingly similar to
language used in myriad tariff classification cases from the
Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit,15 the Supreme Court characterized a patent
case as consisting of two elements. “The first is a question of
law, to be determined by the court, construing the letterspatent, and the description of the invention and specification of
claim annexed to them. The second is a question of fact, to be
submitted to a jury.”16 In the end, the Supreme Court determined that the interpretation and construction of patent claims
is the province of judges. According to Justice Souter:
The construction of written instruments is one of those things
that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors
unburdened by training in exegesis. Patent construction in

12. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
13. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 373.
14. Rule 38 of the Rules of the Court of International Trade (“C.I.T.”) preserves the right to a jury trial in cases where that right is conferred by the
Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In other cases, including classification cases, an “advisory jury” is possible. 28 U.S.C.A. C.I.T. Rule 39(c)
(2010).
15. See, e.g., Faus Group Inc., v. United States, 581 F.3d 1369, 1371-72
(Fed. Cir. 2009); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 189 F.3d 1346, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
16. Markman, 517 U.S. at 384.
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particular “is a special occupation, requiring, like all others,
special training and practice. The judge, from his training and
discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to
such instruments than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely
to be right, in performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be.”17

As a result of this finding, a practice has developed in which
district court judges hold so-called Markman hearings. By way
of example, consider the Local Patent Rules of the Northern
District of Illinois.18 These rules require patent litigants to exchange lists of phrases the court should construe, the proposed
construction of those terms, and, among other things, the elements of the subject merchandise or process that relate to the
terms.19 Within seven days of this exchange, the parties must
agree on up to ten claims to be submitted to the court.20
After the list of claims for construction has been submitted,
the party opposing infringement is given thirty-five days to
submit briefs supporting their respective constructions of the
claims.21 The brief may contain extrinsic and intrinsic evidence
in support of the proposed constructions. Furthermore, the parties may rely on testimony in a sworn statement. The rules
then provide for response and reply briefs concerning claim
construction and a joint appendix of supporting evidence. Finally, within twenty-eight days of the submission of the last
brief, the judge may hold an oral argument or hearing on the
proper construction of the tariff terms.22
Using this process, the district court ensures that the questions of law arising out of claims construction are addressed by
the court. The process, however, also has the potential to allow
the court, through early intervention on questions of law, to
narrow the issues to be addressed in discovery and subsequent
proceedings. As a result, early claims construction may lead to
settlement or the entry of summary judgment, which is explicitly recognized by the Northern District of Illinois in its comments to Local Patent Rule 4.1. According to that Comment:

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 388-89 (citation omitted).
N.D. Ill. Local Patent Rules [hereinafter LPR].
Id. at 4.1(a).
Id. at 4.1(b).
Id. at 4.2(a).
Id. at 4.3.
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In some cases, the parties may dispute the construction of
more than ten terms. But because construction of outcomedeterminative or otherwise significant claim terms may lead
to settlement or entry of summary judgment, in the majority of
cases the need to construe other claim terms of lesser importance may be obviated. The limitation to ten claim terms
to be presented for construction is intended to require the parties to focus upon outcome-determinative or otherwise significant disputes.23

II. TARIFF CLASSIFICATION
When merchandise is imported to the United States, the importer is required to identify the nature of the merchandise by
providing an eight-digit tariff classification number under the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.24 Customs
uses this information, in part, to assess duties on the importation. Because of the tariff classification’s importance to the administration of the customs laws, importers are required to exercise “reasonable care” when reporting classifications, as well
as other information, to Customs.25 When Customs finally determines the classification of the goods and otherwise completes its processing of the importation, it “liquidates the entry.”26 Liquidation is the final determination of the duties owed
with respect to that entry of merchandise.27
The Harmonized System (“HS”) for tariff classification was
developed by the Customs Cooperation Council —now known
as the World Customs Organization. The United States implemented the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States

23. N.D. Ill. LPR 4.1. cmt. (emphasis added).
24. 19 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1)(B) (2012). Two additional digits are appended to
the tariff item for use by the Bureau of Census and do not affect the rate of
duty applicable to the imported merchandise. See, e.g., Figure 1, infra, illustrating the eight-digit heading/subheading combination and the two-digit
statistical suffix.
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) (2012). “Reasonable care,” in this context, has
been defined as the absence of negligence. United States v. Optrex America,
Inc., 30 C.I.T. 650, 661 (2006). More specifically, customs negligence occurs
when an importer fails “to exercise the degree of reasonable care and competence expected from a person in the same circumstances . . . “ See 19 C.F.R.
Pt. 171 app. B(C)(1) (2012).
26. 19 U.S.C. § 1500 (2012).
27. Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 568 F.3d 1360, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2013).

2014]

TARIFF CLASSIFICATION LITIGATION

961

(“HTSUS”) in 1989 pursuant to the Convention on the Harmonized System.28
Internationally, the HS is broken down into twenty-one sections and ninety-seven chapters describing, in varying degrees
of detail, all physical merchandise that might be imported into
the United States. There are additional U.S.-specific provisions
providing for special rates of duties, quotas, and other special
treatment.
As is illustrated in Figure 1, each chapter of the HTSUS is
broken down into four-digit headings, which are the main operational units of the classification system. In this example,
Heading 9205 covers “Wind musical instruments (for example
keyboard pipe organs, accordions, clarinets, trumpets, bagpipes) other than fairground organs and mechanical street organs.” Headings are further broken down into six-digit subheadings and eight-digit tariff items (e.g., brass-wind instruments of 9205.10.00 and bagpipes of 9205.90.20). The applicable rate of duty is identified in column 1 under the heading
“General.” For example, brass instruments are subject to a
2.9% rate of duty while bagpipes are duty free. The “Special”
rate of duty identifies applicable duty preference programs
such as NAFTA (“CA” or “MX”), Chile (“CL”), and the Generalized System of Preferences (“A”).
Importers, government officials, and courts seeking to interpret the HTSUS apply the included General Rules of Interpretation, shown in Figure 2. These rules, and the binding section
and chapter notes, are designed to differentiate between multiple headings that might otherwise appear to describe the same
merchandise. The Explanatory Notes to the Harmonized System, which are published by the World Customs Organization,
provide commentary on the scope of the various components of
the Harmonized System, but are not binding on Customs or the
courts.29 Prior decisions of the Court of International Trade and
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are also useful
tools for interpreting the tariff schedule. Lastly, Customs and
Border Protection publishes private letter rulings to import-

28. See 19 U.S.C. § 3011(a)(1)(A) (2012).
29. Although not binding, the Explanatory Notes are considered persuasive
and generally indicative of the meaning of a tariff term. LeMans Corp. v.
United States, 675 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1380 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010), aff’d, 660
F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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ers.30 The rulings illustrate the agency’s understanding of the
relevant tariff language.

30. The rulings are published by U.S. Customs and Border Protection
online. See CROSS Customs Rulings Online Search System, U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION, http://rulings.cbp.gov (last visited April 5, 2014).
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III. TARIFF LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. Court of International Trade is an Article III court31
and has exclusive jurisdiction to hear challenges to tariff classification determinations by Customs.32 In most cases, the importer challenges the determination via an administrative protest.33 Customs decides the protest internally and, if denied,
the protesting party may file a summons in the Court of International Trade.34
In contrast to most forms of administrative review in U.S.
courts, tariff classification cases are reviewed de novo.35 The
judge is statutorily directed to decide the case upon the record
developed in the judicial proceeding. The parties engage in discovery including the exchange of interrogatories and depositions to prepare for a trial on the merits.36 As stated above,
there are few disputes as to the nature of the imported merchandise and questions of fact are often absent or limited. As a
result, these cases are most often decided on the basis of cross
motions for summary judgment without the need for a trial.
Like a district court in a patent case, the Court of International Trade applies a two part analysis to decide a classification case. In the first part, the court determines the proper
meaning of the relevant tariff terms.37 This is purely a question
of law. In the second part, the court determines whether the
merchandise at issue falls within a particular tariff provision.38
The court is then charged with applying the law to the available facts to arrive at a correct tariff classification, even if the
correct result is not one proposed by one of the parties.39 Appeals from the Court of International Trade go to the Court of

31. 28 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2012).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2012).
33. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (2012); see also 19 C.F.R. § 174.11(b)(2).
34. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 174.21, 174.29 (2012). In classification cases, the
summons is the initial pleading in the action. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1) (2012). Tyco Fire Prods. L.P. v. United
States, 918 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1339 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013).
36. See 28 U.S.C.A. C.I.T. Rule 26 (2012).
37. Faus Group, 581 F.3d at 1371-72; Orlando Food Corp v. United States,
140 F.3d 1437, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
38. Id.
39. Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g
denied, 739 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit40 and then ultimately—but
rarely—to the Supreme Court. It is important to this discussion
that the Federal Circuit is also the sole Court of Appeals for
patent cases appealed from the regional district courts.41
When construing the tariff language as a matter of law, the
court is to determine the “common and commercial meaning” of
the tariff terms.42 Absent evidence to the contrary, the common
and the commercial meaning are presumed to be the same.43 In
making this determination, the judge may rely upon his or her
own understanding of the words, so-called lexicographical
sources, and expert testimony.44
With respect to the development of a factual record, the parties may engage in detailed discovery concerning the physical
nature of the merchandise. Often, this involves responding to
numerous interrogatories and producing corporate records concerning the design, production, marketing, and use of the product as well as depositions of both fact and expert witnesses.
There are no reliable statistics available concerning discovery
practices at the Court of International Trade. Nevertheless, the
nature of these cases is that the plaintiff, which is usually the
importer, holds all of the knowledge and expertise concerning
the nature of the imported product. The defendant, which is
the United States Government, must use the mandatory disclosure information and discovery tools to learn about the product.
At the same time, the plaintiff may engage in discovery to determine, to the extent that it is documented, the government’s
decision making process and analysis. As would be expected in
a case that might turn on the resolution of disputed facts, both
parties use discovery tools to look for inconsistencies in testimony, probe credibility, create evidentiary foundations, and to
find facts that, based on their understanding of the relevant
tariff terms, support their desired outcome. In other words, the
parties engage in potentially expensive and time-consuming
discovery as would careful lawyers in most federal litigation.
But, unlike most other kinds of litigation, much of that time
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2012).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
42. Cummins Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted).
43. Id.
44. Baxter Healthcare v. United States, 22 C.I.T. 82, 88-89 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1998) (citation omitted) aff’d, 182 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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and effort is often wasted because the court’s interpretation of
the controlling statute—the HTSUS—decides or substantially
focuses the dispute as a matter of law.
IV. CLASSIFICATION CASE STUDIES
The following cases are presented to illustrate the principles
discussed in this paper and as examples for practitioners to
consider whether the Markman model would present a means
of achieving a faster resolution of the case.
A. Firstrax v. United States
This case45 involved the tariff classification of collapsible pet
crates made of a steel frame and textile covering.46 Upon liquidation of the entries, Customs determined that the correct tariff classification for the crates was in Heading 4202,47 which
provides for:
Trunks, suitcases, vanity cases, attaché cases, briefcases,
school satchels, spectacle cases, binocular cases, camera cases, musical instrument cases, gun cases, holsters and similar
containers; traveling bags, insulated food or beverage bags,
toiletry bags, knapsacks and backpacks, handbags, shopping
bags, wallets, purses, map cases, cigarette cases, tobacco
pouches, tool bags, sports bags, bottle cases, jewelry boxes,
powder cases, cutlery cases and similar containers, of leather
or of composition leather, of sheeting of plastics, of textile materials, of vulcanized fiber or of paperboard, or wholly or
mainly covered with such materials or with paper. . .

Classification in this heading, specifically in tariff item
4202.92.90, resulted in an applicable rate of duty of 17.6%.48
For its part, the plaintiff believed the correct classification to
be as an “other made up article” of textiles, classifiable in tariff
item 6307.90.98, which carries a rate of duty of 7%.49
In other cases, the Court of International Trade and Federal
Circuit had held that products properly classifiable in Heading
4202 are designed to protect, organize, store, and transport
45. Firstrax v. United States, No. 07-00097, 2011 WL 5024271 (Ct. Int’l
Trade Oct. 21, 2011).
46. Id. at *1.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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personal property of some kind.50 As a result, the discovery
process focused on the factual questions of whether the pet
crates were designed, marketed, and used to organize, store,
protect and transport pets, primarily dogs.
B. Del Monte Corp. v. United States
Del Monte Corp. imported prepackaged tuna meat prepared
with the addition of a flavored sauce in an airtight pouch.51 The
sauce contained a small amount of oil, which was intended to
function as a flavor dispersant or emulsifier. The amount of the
oil was between 0.62% and 2.48% by weight of the contents.52
According to counsel for the importer, the predominant additive to the tuna was water.53 The question before the court was
whether the tuna was classifiable as tuna in airtight containers
“[n]ot in oil.”54
Practitioners familiar with customs litigation can imagine
the scope and nature of discovery involved in this case. It is
likely that Del Monte personnel provided detailed factual information concerning the formulation and function of the sauce
mixture. There may also have been significant time spent with
both lay and expert witnesses explaining the function performed by the small amount of oil in the mixture. Nevertheless,
the case turned on the question of whether there is a de minimis amount of oil permissible in tuna “[n]ot in oil.”
C. Salem Minerals v. United States
The last case for illustration involves the importation of decorative glass vials containing small amounts of gold leaf in a
liquid suspension.55 These items were sold to tourists in gold
producing regions and were not considered to be items of jewelry or fine goods.56 The importer wanted to have the goods clas-

50. Avenues in Leather, Inc. v. United States, 317 F.3d 1399, 1401 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
51. Del Monte Corp. v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1316 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2012).
52. Id. at 1317.
53. Id. at 1318.
54. Id. at 1319.
55. Salem Minerals, Inc. v. United States, No. 07-00227, 2012 WL
2700424, at *1 (Ct. Int’l Trade June 26, 2012).
56. Id. at *2.
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sified as other articles of precious metals.57 Customs classified
the goods as articles of goldsmith’s wares.58 Thus, the sole
question presented to the court to resolve the case was the
meaning of the term “goldsmith’s wares.” There appears to
have been no material dispute as to the nature of the product
or its production. Nevertheless, there seems to have been significant inquiry into the facts surrounding the production process involved in making the gold leaf as well as the vial and
decorative cap.
V. APPLYING THE MARKMAN MODEL TO CLASSIFICATION CASES
Practitioners who adopt an approach similar to that undertaken in patent cases in the wake of Markman may reduce the
scope of discovery undertaken in customs classification cases
and improve the efficiency of deciding these issues. If, for example, either party in a classification case identifies a controlling question of tariff interpretation, that question can be presented to the court early as a motion for partial summary
judgment under CIT Rule 56.59 A prompt decision by the court
on the scope of the tariff heading might sufficiently clarify the
controlling law to permit a stipulated judgment, settlement, or
voluntary dismissal of the action. Even if the legal determination is not dispositive as to the entire case, at least counsel,
who knows the scope of the tariff headings involved, can then
tailor discovery accordingly.
For example, in the Firstrax case, the main question to be decided was the scope of HTSUS Heading 4202. Specifically,
whether the collapsible pet crates were similar to the exemplars of, among other things, traveling bags, knapsacks and
backpacks, tool bags, and sports bags. Plaintiff’s argument was
based partly on the premise that none of the containers used as
exemplars in Heading 4202 are used to contain a living animal.60 As a result, the pet crates were not “similar to” the items
included in Heading 4202 and were therefore excluded from
4202 classification.61 This is a question that could have been
put to the Court of International Trade prior to either party
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at *1.
Id.
28 U.S.C.A. C.I.T. Rule 56(a) (2013).
Firstrax, 2011 WL 5024271, at *1.
Id. at *7.
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conducting any discovery. Further, had the court agreed, it is
entirely possible that the case would have settled because of
the lack of an alternative classification. Had the court disagreed, the parties could then have proceeded to discovery on
whether the pet crates were able to protect, organize, store,
and transport pets.
Del Monte turned on the meaning of the tariff term “[n]ot in
oil.” Thus, given a product that unquestionably contains a
small amount of oil in the closed pouch, the possibly dispositive
question was whether there existed a de minimis amount of oil.
The court eventually held that 0.62% by weight of oil was a sufficient amount for the tuna to be considered packed “in oil.”62
Had the parties asked the court whether that level of oil in the
sauce mixture would be sufficient to make the tuna classifiable
as “in oil,” that determination may have resolved the case. Or,
the parties may have wanted a decision on additional legal
questions such as whether the oil needed to act as a flavoring
or preservative agent.
Finally, in Salem Minerals, had the parties asked the court to
define “goldsmith’s wares” prior to the commencement of discovery, the parties may have avoided significant time and expense. In particular, the parties might have resolved the matter had they known at the start of the case that the court would
find goldsmith’s wares to be limited to useful articles formed of
gold for household, office, or religious use—including jewelry.63
This definition excluded the gold leaf from the meaning of goldsmith’s wares, as leaf is a semi-manufactured form of gold, not
an article of gold.64 Furthermore, the court’s definition excluded
objects plated in gold, including the stoppers in the vials.65
Without regard to any factual disputes to be resolved in discovery, the definition of the term “goldsmith’s wares” may have
resolved this case or substantially facilitated an early resolution.
VI. POSSIBLE CONCERNS
For practitioners, the application of Markman-style procedures to tariff classification litigation may appear to present
62.
63.
64.
65.

Del Monte Corp., 885 F. Supp. 2d at 1320.
Salem Minerals, Inc., 2012 WL 2700424, at *7.
Id.
Id.
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practical problems and raise questions for both the private litigant and the U.S. Department of Justice. The most obvious
question is whether this approach might result in the conclusion of litigation in the absence of a full record made before the
court. The short answer to that concern is that it is intended to
result in cases being decided before a full record is developed
with respect to the facts involved. This approach is based on
practical experience in customs litigation as well as the observation that the Court of International Trade holds very few trials in the course of any given year. Rather, the court resolves
almost all classification disputes on motions for summary
judgment. This is an acknowledgement that these cases turn
on legal interpretations rather than factual disputes and that
discovery that is often considered necessary by a prudent lawyer may not be necessary or particularly useful in classification
cases.
More important, a party seeking an early determination as to
the meaning of relevant tariff terms has few limitations on
what can be submitted to the court. The court has repeatedly
noted that to determine the common and commercial meaning
of an undefined tariff term, it may consult dictionaries, scientific authorities, and other reliable information sources including “lexicographic and other materials.”66 The court may also
rely on its own understanding of the term used.67 Lastly, the
court may consider expert opinions regarding the common
meaning or understanding of a term in a particular industry or
context. These expert opinions are advisory in nature, and the
court will give them weight only to the extent they are consistent with lexicographic and other reliable sources.68
What this means is that the parties to a classification case
who opt to seek an early resolution of a classification matter
may present to the court fully formed arguments concerning
the legal issues. These arguments can be based on standard
and technical dictionaries, expert opinions, and lexicographical
sources. While it is true that much discovery in tariff litigation
is directed at cataloging particular examples of use by the parties and the relevant industry, individual examples of usage by
66. See, e.g., Simod America Corp. v. United States, 872 F.2d 1572, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
67. See, e.g., Airflow Tech., Inc. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1287, 1291 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
68. Samsung, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
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the importer or Customs personnel are of limited value in identifying the common, English meaning of a term. Furthermore,
those examples of usage could easily be included in early, mandatory disclosures to the opposing party. Consequently, it does
not appear that adopting a Markman style approach to resolving questions of law in tariff litigation will produce decisions on
the question of law that were based on an undeveloped record.
A second area of concern might be the appealability of the
isolated legal determination as to the meaning of the tariff
term. Given that the majority of tariff classification decisions
appealed from the Court of International Trade are currently
taken from decisions on motions for summary judgment, this
does not appear to present a problem. The party that disagrees
with the decision rendered on the legal question would, presumably, not agree to an early settlement or stipulation. As a
result, the case would continue until such time as either party
believed it had sufficient grounds to move for complete summary judgment. Assuming a decision on the merits, the case
would not be different than any other summary judgment decision. Should the Court of Appeals reverse the Court of International Trade’s legal interpretation, the case would be remanded
for further proceedings. Given the change in legal interpretation necessitated by a reversal, additional discovery may be required in order to determine how the court should interpret the
tariff language. The Court of International Trade would need to
permit that discovery to occur. Given the similarity of this process to patent litigation, it is likely that the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit will be comfortable with this type of bifurcated process.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Counsel in customs classification cases should realistically
review their cases and make an early determination as to the
real, controlling questions. It is possible that there may be significant disputes as to material facts that will prevent a case
from being decided on the basis of a motion for summary judgment. Those cases are, however, in the minority.
In the more usual circumstance, the case turns on a question
of law based on the interpretation of the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule. In these cases, practitioners should seek to engage
the court early to receive a definitive ruling as to the meaning
of the disputed tariff language. That step will either promote
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the resolution of the case through voluntary dismissal or stipulated judgment, or it will focus the parties on discovery relevant to the tariff term’s legal meaning.
The most obvious means of implementing this approach is a
motion on the initiative of one or both parties through the Rule
56(a) partial summary judgment process.69 Another possibility
is for the assigned judge or a party to request that the classification be referred to Court-Annexed Mediation pursuant to CIT
Rule 16.1.70 In mediation, a judge of the Court of International
Trade could provide an expert and impartial view as to the
meaning and scope of the tariff language. This might encourage
the parties to more realistically evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of their cases and, as discussed above, might limit
and focus discovery to the relevant physical characteristics of
the merchandise.
If, however, litigants do not approach the tariff litigation using these tools and the court sees value in this approach, the
court is not without recourse. Under Rule 16.1, a judge can refer the action to mediation.71 Or, if the Court of International
Trade chooses, it can follow the lead of district courts that have
promulgated local rules to implement the Markman process.
Specifically, if necessary or desirable, the Court of International Trade could consider adopting rules similar to local patent rules under which the parties would be required to consult
and present to the court a list of tariff terms to be construed.
Each party would then be permitted to submit briefs supporting their respective constructions of the disputed tariff terms.
Those briefs would contain any available evidence of common
and commercial meaning or commercial designation, including
lexicographical materials and expert opinion. The parties
would then be permitted to submit reply briefs, and, if deemed
necessary, the court could hold an oral argument during which
the experts could speak.
CONCLUSION
Customs litigation, as it is typically undertaken, looks very
much like commercial litigation in any federal court. Practitioners, who understandably do not know what information the
69. 28 U.S.C.A. C.I.T. Rule 56(a) (2013).
70. 28 U.S.C.A. C.I.T. Rule 16.1 (2009).
71. Id.
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other side may have, often engage in multiple rounds of depositions, interrogatories, and requests for production. Much of
that effort is directed at finding out the detailed specifications
of the imported product, which is not realistically in dispute.
Furthermore, both sides use discovery to explore and catalog
the language individuals and companies use in relation to the
product. This is also of minimal probative impact when trying
to determine the common meaning of a term in the English
language, as opposed to that term’s common meaning within a
particular company or in the parlance of a handful of individuals.
More often than not, there is no smoking gun in corporate file
drawers. There is rarely a “Gotcha!” moment when the president of the importer testifying in a deposition changes her
statement as to the meaning of a term. Moreover, on an occasion when that happens, the impact of the evidence is of limited
value when weighed against dictionaries, technical references,
and expert opinion. Consequently, there is significant lawyering invested in fact-based discovery, the related questions of
evidence law, and linguistic hunts for needles in the haystacks
of business records.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is familiar with
Markman and has experience reviewing the decisions of the
district courts where there have been bifurcated proceedings to
resolve questions of law and fact. As a result, adopting a similar approach to customs litigation should not present any analytical problems for the Federal Circuit. Furthermore, the
Court of International Trade bases most of its tariff classification decisions exclusively on questions of law, without regard to
disputed material facts. Thus, the process for appealing a bifurcated classification case will present no procedural or administrative difficulties for the parties or either court.
Reversing the current process of tariff litigation by resolving
questions of law early in the process will likely result in significantly more efficient resolutions of these matters. An early judicial decision as to the scope of tariff language will, at a minimum, focus discovery on the relevant questions. In many cases,
a decision as to what the disputed language means may result
in the complete resolution of the case without the need for any
discovery. Thus, this suggested process, which can be undertaken by practitioners without a change in the court’s rules,
will benefit the parties, the court, and the public.

